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Sources for this discussion:
1. RADM A. Jay Cristol, dissertation, THE LIBERTY INCIDENT, 1977.
2. VADM DONALD ENGEN, commander of carrier AMERICA in 1967, author of WINGS AND WARRIORS, 1997.
3. JAMES ENNES, officer on LIBERTY, 1967, author or LIBERTY INCIDENT.
4. CPO Julian Hart, communications officer in Morocco, 1967.
5. LCDR David Lewis, officer on LIBERTY 1967.
6. Captain Joseph Tully, commander of SARATOGA, 1967.
The accounts of the rescue flights and their recall rely upon minimal and inadequate documentation, possible flawed memories, and unanswered questions. As a result, the story is one of loose ends, unresolved problems and partisan charges. Yet the issues are of such importance that the debate cannot be avoided.
There are two issues of the greatest importance. (1) We are dealing with the problem of the 90 minute delay, and final cancellation, in sending rescue flights to LIBERTY, when as far as the White House and the Sixth Fleet knew the ship was under constant attack and in danger of sinking. It would seem that only the most serious reasons could justify the recall of the flights. Yet if Dave Lewis is correct, LBJ stopped these flights in order to avoid any clash with Israel. As serious as this matter is, no Congressman or journalist asked LBJ or McNamara a single question about it in the 34 years since the attack. (2) There is a problem concerning the timing of events. ADM Geis, speaking through Dave Lewis, says that McNamara ordered the cancellation of the first rescue flight at 0900 White House time. Yet the official history (such as President's Daily Diary) states that LBJ (and McNamara) were first notified of the attack on LIBERTY at 0949 White House time, nearly an hour later. If Geis is correct, then the White House documents are false and part of a cover-up.
The LIBERTY crewmen's account of the flights and recalls:
(1) Tully and Geis: flight from SARATOGA at 1450. Planes recalled at once by radiotelephone call from McNamara; planes returned to carrier at 1500. Tully ordered to wait for 90 minutes before a new flight. He said that his planes were ready to fly at once but he got no answer. Geis claimed that he protested McNamara's order for recall and spoke to LBJ but this availed nothing. (No official record of this flight and recall; no record of calls from LBJ or McNamara).
Carrier AMERICA was not able to send planes on this flight because the carrier was in the midst of training exercises and had no ready group of planes available for an hour.
(2) Tully, Ennes and Cristol: At 1630 flights were launched from both carriers, but meanwhile events were moving to cancel need for flights. At 1610 Israel notified US attaché Castle that it had accidentally attacked LIBERTY. Castle's message on this reached White House at 1704 and went to Situation Room where LBJ met with advisers. McNamara contacted 6th fleet by radiotelephone; flights ordered at 1715 to return to carriers.
Cristol strongly attacks the above account of the 1450 flight on these grounds:
(1) It was not possible in 1967 to speak from Washington to a ship in the Mediterranean by radiotelephone.
(2) There was a well established chain of command from Geis to McNamara; Geis was not likely to shortcut this.
(3) McNamara in an interview with Cristol denies that he spoke to anyone in the Sixth Fleet on that day, and in particular did not speak to Geis.
Crewmen response to Cristol criticism:
(1) There was standard equipment for radiotelephone calls from White House to ships in Mediterranean in 1967. In fact, in another interview with Cristol, contradicting the one described above, McNamara says that he used radiotelephone to Sixth Fleet to recall the flight at 1715.
(2) Engen, although he generally praises Cristol and backs his version of events, nevertheless backs the LIBERTY men in detailed accounts and says that McNamara spoke directly to Geis by radiotelephone.
(3) Although a chain of command existed, the crewmen claim that LBJ and McNamara ignored it when speed of contact was an urgent matter.
(4) Call from McNamara to Geis was relayed through a US Naval communications station in Morocco and overheard by CPO Julian Hart, who later contacted Ennes to provide this evidence.
The discussion above concerns the 1450 flight from SARATOGA, and the1630 flight from both carriers. There are two other accounts of flights which provide uncertain information or false data. These are:
1. (From Cristol): Flights from both carriers at 1516 by order of ADM Martin; called back at 1609 after 55 minute flight. We do not know why flights were recalled. They were only a few miles from LIBERTY at the time.
2. (From Engen): A flight took off from AMERICA at 1600 but was called back at once by RADM Geis. Engen says that LBJ had told Geis that Israel had admitted it accidentally attacked LIBERTY. However, the Israelis did not make this admission until 1700, an hour later, so this account makes no sense.
It is difficult to understand the two accounts above. Among other things, if both accounts were true, at about 1600-1609 we would have a situation where one flight was headed for LIBERTY while another flight, much nearer, was turning back in order and NOT to contact the ship.
The story of the rescue flights is poorly documented and largely still unknown. Tully was not able to find out why the 90 minute delay in the rescue flights was ordered. In a similar way, ADM Thomas Moorer says that later in his capacity as member of the JCS and as CNO, he was never able to find out the reason for the delay. It was considered a closely guarded secret.
Because this is still an area of unexplored history, the LIBERTY men hope to eventually have a Congressional hearing on the issue.
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